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Excess success for three related
papers on racial bias
Gregory Francis1,2*
1 Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA, 2 Brain Mind Institute, École
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Three related articles reported that racial bias altered perceptual experience and
influenced decision-making. These findings have been applied to training programs
for law enforcement, and elsewhere, to mitigate racial bias. However, a statistical
analysis of each of the three articles finds that the reported experimental results should
be rare, even if the theoretical ideas were correct. The analysis estimates that the
probability of the reported experimental success for the articles is 0.003, 0.048, and
0.070, respectively. These low probabilities suggest that similar future work is unlikely
to produce as successful outcomes and indicates that readers should be skeptical
about the validity of the reported findings and their theoretical implications. The reported
findings should not be used to guide policies related to racial bias, and new experimental
work is needed to judge the merit of the theoretical ideas.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, Eberhardt and colleagues published sets of ﬁndings that concluded racial bias
alters perceptual percepts and inﬂuences behavior and decision-making in a variety of important
ways (such as sentences for criminal violations). These ﬁndings address a very important topic, and
they have been hailed as having important implications for guiding policy and training in police
departments and elsewhere (Laszlo and Fridell, 2012; MacArthur Foundation, 2014; Dreifus, 2015;
Noë, 2015).
The statistical analyses described below indicate that the ﬁndings in several of Eberhardt’s arti-
cles seem too successful relative to what could be expected for the reported size of the eﬀects
and the design of the experiments (Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007; Francis, 2012, 2013a, 2014a;
Schimmack, 2012), which means scientists should be skeptical about the reported theoretical
conclusions and that it may be premature to use these conclusions to inform policy. Before turning
to the analyses of the articles, it may be valuable to describe the general method of the analysis,
which is called the test for excess success (TES).
The theoretical claims about racial bias in the original articles were based on standard hypothesis
tests. Hypothesis tests are designed to control the probability of incorrectly concluding the pres-
ence of an eﬀect (such as population means being diﬀerent) when it does not exist (the population
means are equal). Such control is necessary because even when population means are truly equal
the means of samples randomly drawn from those populations are almost never exactly equal. To
claim statistical signiﬁcance, the diﬀerence of sample statistics must be suﬃciently large to limit the
probability of mistakenly concluding that an eﬀect exists when in reality it does not (this mistake is
called a Type I error). Typically, the criterion for judging signiﬁcance is set so that the Type I error
rate across repeated experiments is 0.05.
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Similarly, even when population means are truly diﬀerent,
some randomly chosen samples will not produce a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence. To not conclude a signiﬁcant eﬀect when it really
does exist is to make a Type II error. The complement of
the Type II error rate is sometimes called power: the prob-
ability that randomly selected samples in an experiment will
reject the null hypothesis when the eﬀect is real. Scientists want
experiments with high power, but unlike the control of Type
I error, which is established by setting the criterion for judg-
ing signiﬁcance, power depends on the size of the true eﬀect
and on the sample sizes. Since, the true eﬀect size is generally
unknown (else the experiment would not be run), it is diﬃ-
cult to precisely control Type II error, so scientists have to do
the best they can by using theoretical ideas, past experience, or
intuition (Vankov et al., 2014) to balance the increased experi-
mental power that comes with a larger sample size against the
costs of time and money that are spent when acquiring a large
sample.
At best hypothesis testing can control, but not eliminate, the
probability of making decision errors. Thus, the very nature of
hypothesis testing is such that scientists are bound to sometimes
make statistical errors in their decisions. For any given experi-
ment, a scientist never knows if they have made an error or a
correct decision, but over multiple experiments errors become
ever more likely. A troubling aspect for some studies in exper-
imental psychology is that, relative to the corresponding theo-
retical claims, such errors largely seem to be missing from the
published record.
Using the published experimental results, it is possible to esti-
mate the probability that an experiment like the one reported
would produce a “successful” outcome. Depending on the theo-
retical claims, success may be a signiﬁcant result, it may be a
non-signiﬁcant result, or it may be a pattern of signiﬁcant and
non-signiﬁcant results. These probability values can be used to
compute PTES, the estimated probability that a replication of all
of the experiments in the set (using the same sample sizes) would
produce outcomes at least as successful as what was originally
reported. Ioannidis and Trikalinos (2007) considered a special
case where success was always to produce a signiﬁcant result and
all experiments measured the same eﬀect. The present analysis
considers a broader combination of outcomes and heterogeneous
eﬀects that are related to a given set of theoretical conclusions
(Francis, 2013a).
If the PTES value is low (a common criterion is 0.1) then scien-
tists should be skeptical about the originally reported outcomes,
because even if the eﬀects are real it is surprising that the
reported experiments would be so successful. Such experiment
sets have excess success. The 0.1 criterion is conservative in the
sense that most scientists would be unsatisﬁed if the set of
experimental ﬁndings used to support their theoretical conclu-
sions replicated only 10% of the time. Indeed, since replication
is considered a gold standard of experimental validation, many
scientists would be concerned if their ﬁndings replicated only
50% of the time.
A set of experimental ﬁndings can have an excess of success
for a variety of reasons (Simmons et al., 2011). Although there
are minor variations, the reasons come in four main classes.
(1) Publication bias. Authors may run unsuccessful experiments
but not publish them. In such a case the published experi-
mental results give a false impression of the magnitude and
reliability of the eﬀects. They also give a false impression
about the validity of the theoretical ideas. Not reporting
unsuccessful outcomes often produces an experiment set
having an excess of successful outcomes.
(2) Improper sampling: To control error rates, standard hypothe-
sis testing requires drawing random samples with a ﬁxed size.
One improper sampling approach is to not use a ﬁxed size,
but to sample and test until a desired outcome is produced.
For example, a scientist might gather data from 15 subjects in
each group and run a hypothesis test that produces p = 0.07.
This result does not satisfy the typical criterion for statis-
tical signiﬁcance, so the scientist adds an additional ﬁve
subjects to each group and runs the test again. If the new
test produces p < 0.05, a signiﬁcant outcome is reported; but
if the new test still produces a non-signiﬁcant outcome, the
scientist may add more subjects or stop the experiment. This
sampling approach dramatically inﬂates the Type I error rate
(the problem is made worse if the unsuccessful outcomes are
not published), and it also generates an excess of successful
outcomes across a set of experiments.
(3) Improper analysis: Oftentimes data sets can be analyzed in a
variety of ways. For example, a scientist might ﬁrst analyze
data with an analysis of variance (ANOVA), which makes
certain assumptions about the properties of the data popula-
tions. Should an unsuccessful result be found (p > 0.05), the
scientist might transform the data and try again, run a diﬀer-
ent test that takes into account other variables, remove some
data points for being outliers, or split the data in various ways
to allow for other types of tests. Trying out diﬀerent types of
analysis methods increases the probability of making a Type
I error, and it also generates an excess of successful outcomes
for a set of experiments.
(4) Theory over fitting: As noted above, experiments with real
eﬀects will sometimes not show those eﬀects and experi-
ments with no eﬀect will sometimes show evidence for an
eﬀect. This uncertainty means that if a theory is derived to
match patterns of signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant outcomes
from experimental data that onlymodestly satisﬁes the signif-
icance criterion, then the theory is very likely to include
some characteristics that are due to noise introduced by
random sampling. Such a theory creation process labels
both signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant outcomes as part of
the theory, and it generates excess success across a set of
experiments.
Regardless of the reason for its appearance, excess success
across a set of experiments suggests some kind of problem in
the experiment set as it relates to the theoretical conclusions.
As such, its presence means scientists should be skeptical about
the data, the analyses, or the theoretical ideas. Of course, excess
success can occur by chance (an unlucky scientist will sometimes
randomly choose samples that happen to produce more success-
ful outcomes than would be expected), but scientists should still
be skeptical about such experiment sets because they appear to
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be too successful and because such unlucky outcomes tend to not
represent reality.
Francis (2013a) provides further details and properties
of the TES. Accompanying commentaries (Gelman, 2013;
Ioannidis, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Morey, 2013; Simonsohn, 2013;
Vandekerckhove et al., 2013) and a response to the commentaries
(Francis, 2013b) further discuss some possible limitations and
characteristics of a TES analysis.
Many previous studies have found evidence that publica-
tion bias is common across psychology and other ﬁelds (e.g.,
Sterling, 1959; Sterling et al., 1995; Bakker et al., 2012; Fraley and
Vazire, 2014; Francis, 2014a,b; Kühberger et al., 2014). Given the
existence of publication bias across the ﬁeld, and newly devel-
oped methods of adjusting for it in some situations (e.g., van
Assen et al., 2014), it is appropriate to consider whether it is
necessary to investigate publication bias for a speciﬁc subset of
experimental studies. Three arguments suggest that the answer is
“yes.”
First, some forms of bias do not necessarily undermine the
relationship between published data and an author’s theoreti-
cal conclusions. In particular, it is possible for a biased ﬁeld
to be made up of experimental subsets that are unbiased rela-
tive to the theoretical conclusions associated with those subsets.
For example, suppose there are two independent projects that
investigate how people use keyboards and how people see visual
afterimages. The ﬁndings and theoretical conclusions from the
afterimage studies are not undermined if the keyboard studies are
suppressed, even though such suppression introduces publica-
tion bias when considering both sets. An experimental scientist’s
role is not to produce uniformly unbiased experimental outcomes
across all topics, but to provide convincing experimental ﬁnd-
ings that support (or refute) theoretical ideas. Thus, even when a
ﬁeld is known to have some bias, it remains necessary to explore
subsets of that ﬁeld to check on bias relative to the corresponding
theoretical claims.
Second, the appearance of bias in an experiment set under-
mines the corresponding theoretical conclusions, so scientists
should be cautious about applying those conclusions outside the
laboratory. If true, the theoretical ideas proposed by Eberhardt
and colleagues about racial bias havemany applications to impor-
tant situations in society; but attempts to mitigate racial bias or to
reduce its presence will likely fail if they are based on conclusions
derived from unconvincing evidence. When sets of experimen-
tal ﬁndings are promoted as being especially important, it is
appropriate and necessary for scientists to re-evaluate them. The
three studies analyzed below have been promoted in this way
(MacArthur Foundation, 2014).
Third, although techniques have been developed to perform
a ﬁxed eﬀect meta-analysis under conditions of publication bias
(van Assen et al., 2014) and for identifying whether biased experi-
ment sets contain some evidential value (Simonsohn et al., 2014),
these methods do not apply to the work of Eberhardt et al.
(2004) because, as described below, the experiments measured
widely diﬀering eﬀects and because a successful outcome within
an experiment often involvesmultiple hypothesis tests.Moreover,
in many situations the relevant scientiﬁc question is not whether
there is some evidential value in the reported experiments, but
whether the presented theoretical conclusions are supported by
the presented experimental results. Even if a set of experiments
has some evidential value it still might not support the theoretical
claims.
It is important to emphasize that the TES analyses in this paper
investigate the relationship between experimental ﬁndings and
theoretical conclusions. The analyses do not demonstrate that
the original authors acted in a dishonest manner or committed
scientiﬁc misconduct. Until proven otherwise, the appearance of
excess success should be taken to mean that the original authors
appear to have made decisions in their analyses or reporting that
could have inﬂated Type I error rates or eﬀect size estimates. Such
mistakes are hardly rare in the ﬁeld of psychology, and they need
to be identiﬁed and recognized, when possible.
Materials and Methods
Article selection was motived by the MacArthur Foundation
referring to Eberhardt’s studies on racial bias as motivation for
awarding her a “genius” fellowship (MacArthur Foundation,
2014). On 17 September 2014, the web site (http://web.stanford.
edu/group/mcslab/cgi-bin/wordpress/publications/) for the
“Mind, Culture, and Society Lab at Stanford” listed Eberhardt as
being an author or co-author of six articles from a list of “Selected
Recent Publications.” The excess success analysis requires multi-
ple studies (four is a reasonable minimum number), and three of
the articles contained four or more studies. Each of these three
articles is analyzed below in chronological order.
Results
All of the analysis programs are provided as supplemental
material.
Eberhardt et al. (2004) “Seeing Black: Race,
Crime, and Visual Processing”
This article reported ﬁve studies purporting to show that prim-
ing participants with Black faces or with concepts related
to Black Americans changed properties of visual perception
and attention to be more sensitive to stereotypes of Black
Americans. Table 1 summarizes the statistical measures for
each study, the key hypotheses that were tested in the article,
and the estimated probability of success for those hypothesis
tests.
Study 1 found that priming participants to Black male faces
(rather than White faces or no prime) increased sensitivity to
crime-related objects (rather than crime-irrelevant objects) in a
degraded image. This conclusion was based on seven hypothe-
sis tests: (1) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Black and White
primes for crime-related objects, (2) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the Black and no prime conditions for crime-related
objects, (3) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (in the opposite direction)
between the White and no prime conditions for crime-related
objects, (4) a predicted non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
Black and no prime conditions for crime-irrelevant objects, (5)
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TABLE 1 | Statistical properties, hypotheses, and estimated probability of
success for the tests in the five studies from Eberhardt et al. (2004).
Statistics Supporting
hypotheses
Probability of
success
Study 1 n1 = 13, n2 = 12, n3 = 14
X1A = 26.9, X1B = 24.1, s1A = 4.51,
s1B = 4.76
X2A = 23.0, X2B = 23.2, s1A = 4.57,
s1B = 4.57
X3A = 18.3, X3B = 22.7, s1A = 4.81,
s1B = 4.68
r1AB = 0.582
r2AB = 0.302
µ3A = µ1A
µ3A = µ2A
µ1A = µ2A
µ3B = µ2B
µ1B = µ2B
µ3A = µ3B
µ1A = µ1B
Joint
0.996
0.680
0.541
0.944
0.926
0.780
0.582
0.163
Study 2 n1A = 13, n2A = 12, n1B = 13,
n2B = 12
dA,(1−2) = 1.09, dB,(1−2) = 0.779
µ1A = µ2A
µ1B = µ2B∗
Joint
0.777
0.482
0.380
Study 3 n1A = 17, n2A = 17, n1B = 17,
n2B = 18
dA,(1−2) = 0.746
µ1A = µ2A 0.575
Study 4 n1A = 14, n2A = 14, n1B = 14,
n2B = 15
dA,(1−2) = 0.729, dB,(1−2) = 1.282
µ1A = µ2A†
µ1B = µ2B
Joint
0.484
0.924
0.450
Study 5 n1A = 18, n2A = 20, n1B = 20,
n2B = 20
X1A = 10.83, X1B = 10.50
X2A = 12.95, X2B = 8.80
s = 3.02
µ1 = µ2
Interaction
µ1A = µ1B
µ2A = µ2B
Joint
0.723
0.563
0.569
0.796
0.212
PTES 0.003
∗Eberhardt et al. (2004) concluded statistical significance for p < 0.055. †Eberhardt
et al. (2004) concluded statistical significance for p < 0.053. PTES refers to the
estimated probability of all experiments like these producing successful outcomes.
A bold probability in the final column indicates the joint success probability for the
corresponding study.
a predicted non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the White and no
prime conditions for crime-irrelevant objects, (6) a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between crime-related and crime-irrelevant objects for
participants primed by Black faces, and (7) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
(in the opposite direction) between crime-related and crime-
irrelevant objects for participants primed by White faces. The
study also required a signiﬁcant interaction of prime and rele-
vance, but the reported statistics in Eberhardt et al. (2004) did not
provide enough information to estimate the success probability
for that test (a necessary correlation for one of the within-subject
measures is not reported and cannot be derived from other
statistics).
All of these tests produced results that appeared to support the
theoretical ideas described in Eberhardt et al. (2004). However,
with so many outcomes that must be satisﬁed with a single data
set, such full success should be rare even if the eﬀects are real
and as estimated by the experimental data. To estimate the prob-
ability of such a level of success, a software program (R Core
Team, 2014) was used to generate 100,000 simulated experi-
ments with the sample sizes, means, standard deviations, and
correlations (for within-subject aspects of the experiment) that
were described in (or derived from) Eberhardt et al. (2004).
Table 1 shows that the success probability for any given hypothe-
sis test varies between 0.541 and 0.996, but the joint probability
that all of the tests would be successful in a single experi-
ment is only 0.163 (this value is larger than the product of the
success probabilities of individual tests because the tests are not
independent).
Study 2 reported that participants primed by a crime were
faster to detect a small dot on a Black face than on a White face.
The study used a two (prime: crime or none) by two (dot position:
Black or White face) between-subjects design. The theoretical
ideas were supported by two signiﬁcance tests: (1) a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between primes for Black faces and (2) a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence (in the opposite direction) between primes for White
faces. The second hypothesis test reported p = 0.05, but a recal-
culation for the given F-value indicates that p = 0.054, which
is above the standard 0.05 criterion. Such p-value misreport-
ing is not uncommon (Bakker and Wicherts, 2011; Wicherts
et al., 2011). Regardless, researchers sometimes use an alternative
signiﬁcance criterion; and since Eberhardt et al. (2004) claimed
success for this hypothesis test, their criterion was apparently
something like 0.055 (a much larger criterion would generally
not be accepted by reviewers). Identiﬁcation of this criterion is
necessary to estimate the probability of a successful outcome.
Eberhardt et al. (2004) reported mean latencies but the analysis
was based on an inverse-transform of the latencies (to remove
apparent skewness in the data). As a result, the means of diﬀer-
ent groups cannot be estimated from the data in Eberhardt et al.
(2004). However, the reported test statistics do allow computa-
tion of standardized eﬀect sizes, which can be used to generate
equivalent hypothesis tests. Eberhardt et al. (2004) also required
(and found) a signiﬁcant interaction, but the standardized eﬀect
sizes by themselves are insuﬃcient to include that test among
the reported successes. The standardized eﬀect sizes are shown
in Table 1.
Study 3 had a design similar to Study 2, but used a basket-
ball prime rather than crime. Here, two hypothesis tests were
deemed necessary for success: (1) a signiﬁcant interaction and
(2) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between primes when searching on
a Black face. For reporting details similar to those in Study 2, it
is not possible to estimate success probabilities for both of these
tests (they are not independent), but it is possible to estimate the
success probability of either one with the standardized eﬀect size;
and Table 1 reports the probability for test (2). Eberhardt et al.
(2004) did note that, contrary to Study 2, the eﬀect of primes for
White faces was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. This could have been
interpreted as a non-success, but instead Eberhardt et al. (2004)
chose to interpret the outcome as being due to diﬀerences in the
nature of the priming method. At any rate, they did not treat
the non-signiﬁcant outcome as evidence against their theoretical
ideas.
Study 4 was similar to Study 2 but used police oﬃcers as
participants. The same limitations on the analysis as for Studies
2 and 3 also apply to Study 4. Although a total of ﬁve successful
hypothesis tests were presented to support the theoretical ideas
in Eberhardt et al. (2004), success probabilities can only be esti-
mated for two of the tests: (1) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
primes for Black faces and (2) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (in the
opposite direction) between primes for White faces. The ﬁrst
hypothesis was judged successful with a reported p < 0.05, but
for the given F(1,53) = 3.95 the p-value is actually 0.052. Thus,
for this test, success was apparently concluded for p-values less
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than 0.053, which is what was used for the success probability
calculations.
Study 5 explored eﬀects of race (Black or White) and
racial stereotypicality (high or low) on judgments of criminal-
ity from facial observations. The theoretical ideas were said to
be supported by four hypothesis tests: (1) a main eﬀect of Black
faces versus White faces, (2) a signiﬁcant interaction between
race and stereotypicality, (3) a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
high and low stereotypicality for Black faces, and (4) a non-
signiﬁcant eﬀect of stereotypicality for White faces. The text
reported other tests, but they do not seem necessary for the
theoretical ideas. The means and standard deviations were esti-
mated from Figure 7 in Eberhardt et al. (2004). Recomputing
the statistical tests revealed that none of the reported F-values in
the text agreed with the reported means and standard deviations,
although the patterns of signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant outcomes
were identical. To reconcile this discrepancy, the means were
estimated from Figure 7 and the standard deviation from the F-
values in the text. The analysis by Eberhardt et al. (2004) was
somewhat non-standard as data was gathered from a sample of
166 police oﬃcers but the sample groups used for the hypothesis
tests were the faces. The estimated success probabilities assume
that this non-standard analysis is valid and appropriate for the
theoretical ideas. Although every hypothesis test has a success
probability above one half, the probability of a sample satisfying
all of these tests simultaneously is only 0.212.
If the eﬀects are real and of similar magnitude to what is
reported in the sample data, the experiments were run prop-
erly and analyzed properly, and all relevant studies were fully
reported, then across all ﬁve studies, the probability of the level
of success reported by Eberhardt et al. (2004) is the product of
the joint probabilities for each study. This value is 0.003, mean-
ing that the degree of success reported by Eberhardt et al. (2004)
should be extremely rare, and future studies of the same phenom-
ena should not show nearly the degree of success that is reported
in the original study.
Indeed, the reported ﬁndings should be so rare that it is
doubtful that the ﬁndings in Eberhardt et al. (2004) are repre-
sentative of reality. If unsuccessful experimental outcomes were
not described, then the report of Eberhardt et al. (2004) provides
an inaccurate description of these eﬀects and of the theoreti-
cal validity of the conclusions and implications. The impetus to
support theoretical ideas is on the original authors, but because
the ﬁndings in Eberhardt et al. (2004) appear to be biased in
favor of the researchers’ expectations, they do not provide such
support.
Goff et al. (2008) “Not Yet Human: Implicit
Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and
Contemporary Consequences”
This article reported six studies that purported to show an
implicit association between Black Americans and apes. Table 2
summarizes the statistical measures for each study, the key
hypotheses that were tested in the article, and the estimated
probability of success for those hypothesis tests.
Study 1 measured participant’s sensitivity to apes or other
animals in short degraded movies. Participants varied in priming
TABLE 2 | Statistical properties, hypotheses, and estimated probability of
success for the tests in the six studies from Goff et al. (2008).
Statistics Supporting
hypotheses
Probability of
success
Study 1 n1 = 41, n2 = 40, n3 = 40
X1 = 20.16, X2 = 22.75,
X3 = 26.23
s = 5.05
µ1 = µ2
µ3 = µ2
Joint
0.630
0.861
0.507
Study 2 n1A = 14, n2A = 15, n1B = 14,
n2B = 15
X1A = 1080, X1B = 2503
X2A = 3412, X2B = 1010
s = 2391
Interaction
µ1B = µ2B
µ1A = µ2A
µ1A = µ1B
µ2A = µ2B
Joint
≈1.00
0.993
0.916
0.975
0.968
0.879
Study 3 n1A = 12, n2A = 12, n1B = 12,
n2B = 13
X1A = 625, X1B = 874
X2A = 814, X2B = 801
s = 2999
Interaction
µ1B = µ2B
µ1A = µ2A
µ1A = µ1B
µ2A = µ2B
Joint
0.684
0.948
0.905
0.762
0.882
0.500
Study 4 n1 = 32, n2 = 33
F = 30.46
µ1 = µ2 ≈1.00
Study 5 n1A = 29, n2A = 29, n1B = 29,
n2B = 28
X1A = 3.88, X1B = 2.86
X2A = 2.90, X2B = 3.13
s = 1.49
Interaction
µ1B = µ2B
µ1A = µ2A
µ2A = µ2B
µ1A = µ1B
Joint
0.608
0.896
0.701
0.910
0.736
0.381
Study 6 n1 = 15, n2 = 138
X1 = 2.2, s1 = 2.34
X2 = 8.53, s2 = 12.35
µ1 = µ2 0.565
PTES 0.048
PTES refers to the estimated probability of all experiments like these producing
successful outcomes. A bold probability in the final column indicates the joint
success probability for the corresponding study.
condition (Black faces, White faces, none) and race of partici-
pant (White, non-White). Comparisons were also made within-
subjects for type of animal (ape or non-ape). The primary
hypotheses were for the ape trials: (1) participants were signif-
icantly more sensitive to ape movies when primed by Black
faces than by no prime, and (2) participants were signiﬁcantly
less sensitive to ape movies when primed by White faces than
by no prime. Goﬀ et al. (2008) did include other (successful)
hypothesis tests, but the within-subjects structure of the exper-
iment prohibits calculating success probabilities for all of the
tests because standard reporting practices do not provide enough
information (e.g., correlations between within-subject measures
were not reported). The estimated probability of a random
sample of participants satisfying both tests is just slightly above
one half. Since there were additional successful tests, this value
likely overestimates the probability of replication experiments
being as successful as the original study.
Study 2 reported evidence that participants primed with apes
would have an attentional bias toward Blacks. The experiment
varied prime type (apes or none) and a dot-probe positioned on
a type of face (Black or White) in a between subjects design.
Support for the theoretical ideas was provided by the follow-
ing hypothesis tests: (1) a signiﬁcant interaction between prime
type and face type, (2) a signiﬁcant eﬀect of face type for the no
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prime condition, (3) a signiﬁcant eﬀect (in the opposite direc-
tion) of face type for the ape prime condition, (4) a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of prime type in the Black face condition, and (5) a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect (in the opposite direction) of prime type in the White
face condition. Table 2 indicates that the probability of all these
hypothesis tests being successful in a single sample is around
0.879. Following the analysis in Goﬀ et al. (2008), the mean values
in Table 2 are the measured latencies, but the analysis was based
on the reciprocal of the latencies. The pooled standard deviation
was computed from the reciprocal means and reported F-values.
Table 2 shows that the estimated success probabilities are quite
high for each hypothesis test. The joint success probability is also
only somewhat smaller.
Study 3 was similar to study 2, but used an Asian face rather
than a White face. The theoretical ideas were supported by ﬁve
hypothesis tests: (1) a signiﬁcant interaction between prime type
and face type, (2) a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of face type for the no
prime condition, (3) a signiﬁcant eﬀect of face type for the ape
prime condition, (4) a signiﬁcant eﬀect of prime type in the Black
face condition, and (5) a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of prime type in
the Asian face condition. Table 2 shows that although each test
has a success probability comfortably above one-half, the proba-
bility of all ﬁve tests being successful in a single sample is only one
half.
In Study 4 participants completed an Implicit Association
Test that indicated faster categorization in a Black-ape condi-
tion than in a Black-big cat condition. The key test was for
the relationship to hold even when co-varying for eﬀects of a
personalized IAT. The probability of success for this result can be
estimated by converting the reported F-value to a standardized
eﬀect size.
In Study 5 participants judged violence justiﬁcation in a video
showing police beating a target suspect that was suggested to be
either White or Black. Diﬀerent groups of participants were also
primed for apes or big cats. The theoretical ideas were supported
by ﬁve hypothesis tests: (1) a signiﬁcant interaction between
prime type and target race, (2) a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of prime
type when the target was White, (3) a signiﬁcant eﬀect of prime
type when the target was Black, (4) a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of
target race when the prime was big cats, and (5) a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of target race when the prime was apes. The probability of
a sample producing a successful outcome for all of these eﬀects is
0.381.
Study 6 examined news articles discussing death-penalty eligi-
ble cases and reported a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
number of ape-related words in articles for Black defendants
and White defendants. This test has a success probability just a
bit higher than one half. The analysis included some secondary
hypothesis tests on subsets of the data, but it is not possible to esti-
mate the joint success probabilities for the full set of tests because
the subset sample sizes are not fully described.
Even though two of the studies in Goﬀ et al. (2008)
have quite high success probabilities, the other four stud-
ies have low to modest success probabilities. The theoretical
ideas in Goﬀ et al. (2008) depend on the success of all the
presented results, and the probability that six studies like these
would all be uniformly successful is the product of the joint
success probabilities, which is 0.048. This value is an estimate
of the probability that a set of replication experiments with
the same sample sizes would be as successful as the studies
in Goﬀ et al. (2008). The value is low enough that scien-
tists should be skeptical about the validity of the experimen-
tal results or the theoretical ideas presented in Goﬀ et al.
(2008).
Williams and Eberhardt (2008) “Biological
Conceptions of Race and the Motivation to
Cross Racial Boundaries”
This article reported ﬁve studies that purported to show that
perceiving and interacting with racial outgroups was inﬂuenced
by whether views of race were socially or biologically based.
Table 3 summarizes the statistical measures for each study, the
key hypotheses that were tested in the article, and the estimated
probability of success for those hypothesis tests.
Study 1 reported a signiﬁcant correlation between a race
conception scale (RCS) and average race disparity scores even
when controlling for participant scores on a Modern Racism
Scale. The RCS was designed to measure people’s conceptions
of race as being biologically based. This signiﬁcant correla-
tion was used to support the theoretical ideas. However, an
experiment like this one is only estimated to be successful
around 60% of the time. Several other successful signiﬁcance
tests were also presented as support for the theoretical ideas,
but it is not possible to estimate their joint success probabil-
ity.
Study 2 primed participants to think of race as having a biolog-
ical or social basis and then measured emotional engagement.
The observed diﬀerence in mood was reported as support for
the theoretical ideas. Williams and Eberhardt (2008) used a non-
standard signiﬁcance criterion (p < 0.07), so the same criterion
TABLE 3 | Statistical properties, hypotheses, and estimated probability of
success for the tests in the five studies from Williams and Eberhardt
(2008).
Statistics Supporting
hypotheses
Probability of
success
Study 1 n = 129, r = 0.19 ρ = 0 0.579
Study 2 n1 = 40, n2 = 40
F = 3.38
µ1 = µ2∗ 0.496
Study 3 n = 507, r = −0.26 ρ = 0 ≈1.00
Study 4 n1A = 43, n2A = 57, n3A = 29
n1B = 41, n2B = 55, n3B = 28
X1A = 2.87, X2A = 3.37,
X3A = 3.55
X1B = 3.21, X2B = 3.38,
X3B = 3.30
s = 1.21
µiA = µjA
µ1A = µ2A
µ1A = µ3A
µiB = µjB
Joint
0.614
0.636
0.526
0.915
0.367
Study 5 n1 = 75, n2 = 76
p1 = 0.40, p2 = 0.59
P1 = P2 0.661
PTES 0.070
∗Williams and Eberhardt (2008) concluded statistical significance for p < 0.07. PTES
refers to the estimated probability of all experiments like these producing success-
ful outcomes. A bold probability in the final column indicates the joint success
probability for the corresponding study.
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was used to estimate the success probability for an experiment of
this type. The power of an experiment like this can be estimated
from the standardized eﬀect size, which can be computed from
the provided F-value.
Study 3 reported a signiﬁcant negative correlation between
RCS scores and self-reported motivation for contact with diverse
others. The estimated success probability for an experiment like
this is quite high.
Study 4 assigned participants to a three by two design (three
prime types: biological, social, control; two target race: same,
other) and measured friendship motivation scores. Support for
the theoretical ideas was based on several hypothesis tests: (1)
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of priming condition for participants in the
other race condition, (2) lower friendship motivation scores for
other race condition participants in the biological condition than
in the social condition, (3) lower friendship motivation scores
for other race participants in the biological condition than in
the control condition, (4) non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings for priming
among participants in the same race condition. The estimated
probability of all tests producing a successful outcome is around
one-third.
Study 5 primed participants for either a biological or social
conception of race. Participants were then told that they were
assigned to work with a Black partner on a task and reported
their willingness to sign up for future sessions with the same part-
ner. The proportion of participants willing to sign up for future
sessions was signiﬁcantly lower for those primed with a biological
conception than for those primed for a social conception, but the
estimated probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is around
two-thirds.
Each but one of the studies in Williams and Eberhardt (2008)
has a low to modest joint success probability. The probability
that ﬁve studies like these would all be uniformly successful is
the product of the joint success probabilities, which is 0.070;
and the low value suggests that the reported degree of success is
unlikely to be replicated by future studies with the same sample
sizes and design. Indeed, the probability is low enough that
scientists should doubt the validity of the experimental results
and the theoretical ideas presented in Williams and Eberhardt
(2008).
Discussion
Racial bias and racial discrimination are important and complex
topics. Society needs scientiﬁc investigations that provide good
evidence about the basis and properties of racial bias, but given
the apparent excess success in Eberhardt et al. (2004), Goﬀ et al.
(2008), and Williams and Eberhardt (2008), scientists should be
skeptical about the experimental ﬁndings and theoretical claims
presented in those articles. If the eﬀects were similar to what
was reported and the studies were run, analyzed, and reported
unbiasedly, then the observed degree of success in each article
would be quite rare. This rarity suggests that the ﬁndings were not
run, analyzed, or reported unbiasedly; and thus scientists should
have some skepticism about the merit of the proposed theoretical
ideas.
It is important to recognize that the choices in experimen-
tal design, analysis, theorizing, and reporting for these articles
may reﬂect standard methods in experimental psychology. For
example, Francis (2014a) performed a TES analysis for all recent
articles with four or more experiments that were published in the
prestigious journal Psychological Science. The analyses found that
36 out of 44 articles (82%) failed the TES. A corresponding anal-
ysis of psychology-related articles in the journal Science (Francis
et al., 2014) found a similar rate of excess success (83%).
It is regrettable that the eﬀorts of Eberhardt and colleagues,
however well intentioned and however similar to standard proce-
dures, have resulted in experimental ﬁndings and theories that
do not improve our understanding of such an important topic.
Since these articles do not provide good scientiﬁc support for
the theoretical ideas, it seems premature to apply these ideas to
policy decisions or to interventions that might reduce the pres-
ence or impact of racial bias. Such applications cannot be justiﬁed
on scientiﬁc grounds.
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The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
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